UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-13-2011

State v. Valero Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38923

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Valero Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38923" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3330.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3330

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF I
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JOSE L. VALERO,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 38923

--------------------------)
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF PAYETTE

HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ......................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings .............................. 1

ISSUE ..............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Downplaying
The Seriousness Of The Criminal Acts While Emphasizing
The Seriousness Of Lying To The Police Was Unconstitutional
Police Coercion .....................................................................................4

A.

Introduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard of Review ................................................................... .4

C.

Detective Bartlett's Statements Were Not Coercive ................... 5

D.

The District Court Failed To Review The Totality Of
The Circumstances ........... .......................................................... 9

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ......................................................................... 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) ........................................................ 5
Beltz v. State, 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) ........................................ 6,9
Berghuis v. Thompkins, _

U.S. _,130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) ........................... 12

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) ...................................................... 5,9
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) .............................................................. 5
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) ................................................................... 5
Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir., 1992) .......................................... 10
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) ................................................................ 5
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) ................................................................ 5
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) ............................................................ 11
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) .............................................. 12
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618 (Nevada 1996) ............... 7,8,9
State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536,976 P.2d 462 (1999) ........................... 12, 13
State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934,104 P.3d 976 (Ct. App. 2004) ......................... 11
Statev. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 998 P.2d 80 (2000) .................................. 11, 12
Statev. Troy, 1241daho211, 858 P.2d 750 (1993) ........................................... 13
State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,894 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995) .............. 5,8,9, 11
United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................... 6
United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2010) ..................................... 7, 10

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court order suppressing Valero's
statements to law enforcement.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Valero with sexual abuse of a child and lewd conduct
with a child for sexually fondling a 15-year-old foster child in his care. (R., pp.
19-20, 51-52.)

Valero moved to suppress statements he made to law

enforcement, contending that they were coerced. (R., pp. 36-37.) The basis of
the motion was the allegation that Valero did not understand the Miranda rights
he waived due to language and cognitive difficulties. (Tr., p. 67, L. 22 - p. 68, L.
14.)
The district court rejected Valero's argument:

It found that Valero had

been a special needs student more than twenty years previously because of
problems communicating in English, but that he spoke fluent English at the time
of the interview. (R., pp. 53-54.) The district court on its own motion, however,
addressed whether Valero's statements in the interview, given in conjunction with
a police polygraph examination, were voluntary:
This Court believes that the statements made to Valero [by
detective Bartlett] clearly conveyed the message that the
accusations against Valero were minor in nature, that Bartlett, via
the polygraph had caught Valero lying about the minor accusations
and could testify to that 100% in a court of law, and that the
legal/penal consequences would be worse if he maintained the
crime of lying to the police than if he admitted touching the breast
[of the minor child]. Based on that finding, the Court is inclined to
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conclude that the [sic] Bartlett's tactic was sufficient to overbear
Valero's will.
(R., p. 56.) The district court recognized that "this precise issue" had not been

presented in Valero's motion to suppress, and therefore declared its ruling
"tentative" and gave the state "an opportunity" to present "legal authority" to
"meet its burden to demonstrate that the statement was constitutionally
voluntary." (R., p. 58.) After supplemental briefing (R., pp. 61-66, 70-75), the
court affirmed and made final its prior tentative order (R., pp. 78-79). The state
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 80-82.)
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ISSUE

The district court determined that by downplaying the seriousness of the
sexual contact with a child while stating that he could testify about polygraph
results and emphasizing the seriousness of lying to the police the detective
coerced Valero's incriminating statements. Did the district court err because the
police tactics employed by Detective Bartlett were not constitutionally coercive
and did not overbear Valero's will?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Downplaying The Seriousness
Of The Criminal Acts While Emphasizing The Seriousness Of Lying To The
Police Was Unconstitutional Police Coercion
A.

Introduction
The district court held that Detective Bartlett's statements minimizing the

seriousness of the crime, stating he could testify that Valero was lying, and
emphasizing the importance of telling the truth had a coercive effect on Valero
"sufficient to" overbear his will.

(R., pp. 56-58.)

Although mentioned in the

opinion, the court at no time employed the correct totality of the circumstances
test, instead concluding that certain types of misrepresentations are sufficient by
themselves to coerce incriminating statements. (Id.) The district court's analysis
is incorrect for two reasons.

First, under the correct legal standards Detective

Bartlett's statements, while possibly misrepresentations, did not amount to
coercion in a constitutional sense. Second, even if the misrepresentations were
deemed coercive, the court did not review the totality of the circumstances or find
that Valero's will was overborne, as required by the applicable legal standard.
Application of the totality of the circumstances test shows that the court erred as
a matter of law when it concluded that Valero's incriminating statements were
coerced.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review, the appellate court gives "deference to the lower court's

findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages in "free review
over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show
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voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,928,894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App.
1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal question freely
reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).

C.

Detective Bartlett's Statements Were Not Coercive
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a

confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).

Examples of coercive police action include threats of retaliation for not
cooperating, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (threats to take children
from mother and to deny state welfare benefits unless she cooperated were
coercive), and certain promises in exchange for the confession, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) (promise by government agent to
protect inmate from fellow inmates if he confessed coerced confession). Police
conduct designed to elicit incriminating statements that does not amount to
coercion includes misrepresentations about the evidence against the defendant,
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (false representation that co-defendant had
confessed

and

implicated

defendant

"insufficient"

to

render confession

inadmissible), "[p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of
security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak," Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990), and general statements that cooperation with
the police will be to the suspect's advantage, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
727 (1979).

In sum:

"Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a

confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in
5

custodial ones as well, unless the government makes threats or promises."
United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9 th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
The district court concluded statements made by Detective Bartlett "clearly
conveyed the message that the accusations against Valero were minor in nature,
that Bartlett, via the polygraph had caught Valero lying about the minor
accusations and could testify to that 100% in a court of law, and that the
legal/penal consequences would be worse if he maintained the crime of lying to
the police than if he admitted touching the breast." (R., p. 56.) This "conveyed
message," the district court stated, was "sufficient" to overbear Valero's will. (Id.)
Under the applicable legal standards, however, the "conveyed message" is not
coercive.
In Beltz v. State, 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999), the Alaska Court of
Appeals addressed a claim that an officer had coerced a confession by "[taking]
advantage of Beltz's agitated mental state by seeming to befriend him and by
implicitly promising that Beltz would receive lenient treatment if he confessed."
~

at 478.

Beltz argued that "because [the detective] downplayed the

seriousness of Beltz's crime, Beltz was led to believe that he would suffer no
consequences if he confessed."

~

The court rejected these arguments, first

stating that the general rule was that being sympathetic or friendly or professing
a desire to help the defendant "does not in itself render a subsequent confession
involuntary."

Id.

It had rejected similar arguments that "play[ing] on [a

defendant's] sympathies, minimiz[ing] his guilt, and plac[ing] much of the blame
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for the [crime] on the victim" had resulted in an involuntary confession.

lit

(citations omitted). The court ultimately held the confession voluntary because
"Beltz did not interpret [the detective's] remarks as a promise of immunity." Id. at
479.
Unlike the Alaska court, the district court in this case effectively held that
the detective's remarks rose to the level of a promise of immunity. The district
court relied primarily on United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2010),
finding it "instructive." (R., pp. 56-58.) In Lall the detective told the defendant
and his family that "any information [the defendant] shared with the police would
not be used to prosecute him." Lall, 607 F.3d at 1281. A promise not to use
statements provided during the interview against the suspect contravenes
Miranda and is coercive . .l!;l at 1285-87. In the present case, however, Detective

Bartlett made no statement that can be interpreted as a promise not to use
Valero's statements against him. Rather than make any such promise, Detective
Bartlett merely stated generally that telling the truth would be better for Valero
than lying. In comparison with Lall, Beltz is the more instructive case.
Another instructive case is Sheriff. Washoe County v. Bessey. 914 P.2d
618 (Nevada 1996), where the Nevada Supreme Court held that confronting a
suspect with a fabricated lab report indicating the presence of his DNA on a
couch on which the victim had reported the sexual abuse took place was not
coercive.

"Cases throughout the country support the general rule that

confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so long as
the methods used are not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue
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statement."
deception,

1.!;l at 620.
including

The court listed several types of permissible police

"undercover

police

officers,

sting

operations,

and

interrogation techniques such as offering false sympathy, blaming the victim,
minimizing the seriousness of the charge, using a good-cop/bad-cop routine, or
suggesting there is sufficient evidence when there is not." 1.!;l at 621-22. "As
long as the techniques do not tend to produce inherently unreliable statements or
revolt our sense of justice, they should not be declared violative of the United
States or Nevada constitutions." 1.!;l at 622.
The most instructive case, however, is an Idaho precedent. In State v.
Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 894 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995), Wilson was arrested
based on allegations by his 15-year-old step-daughter that Wilson had engaged
her in intercourse.

When being transported by Lieutenant Skott Mealor, an

acquaintance of several years, Wilson made incriminating statements, and then
additional statements at the jail.

kl at 927,

894 P.2d at 160. Wilson alleged that

Mealor "improperly induced him to confess," despite giving him Miranda
warnings, "[b]y downplaying the seriousness of the charges, by stressing the
harm that might come to Wilson's family and by making implied promises of
leniency." 1.!;l at 928-29, 894 P.2d at 161-62. The court, applying the relevant
law, concluded that because Wilson had in fact understood his Miranda rights the
acts of downplaying the seriousness of the charges, stressing the harm that
might come to Wilson's family, and implying that leniency would follow a
confession did not make the confession involuntary.
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kl at 929,894 P.2d at 162.

Here the techniques engaged in by Detective Bartlett as identified by the
district court might be considered deceptive, but were not coercive.

Those

techniques included "minimizing the seriousness of the charge," Bessey, 914
P.2d at 622, which Detective Bartlett did when he stated the accusations were
not "big deals" and were "minor" (R., p. 52); "suggesting that there is sufficient
evidence when there is not," Bessey, 914 P.2d at 622, when he told Valero he
could testify with 100% certainty that Valero had touched the victim's breasts (R.,
p. 53); and telling him that he "would be better off telling the truth, or that [his]
cooperation might influence the ultimate result of the investigation or prosecution"
Beltz, 980 P.2d at 478, when he told Valero that he would make things worse,
and put himself in a "bad spot," if he committed the "crime of lying to the police"
(R., p. 53).

All of the conduct engaged in by Detective Bartlett was within the

constitutional bounds of proper interrogation.

The district court erred by

concluding otherwise.

D.

The District Court Failed To Review The Totality Of The Circumstances
Even if the detective's statements could be deemed constitutionally

coercive, the district court erred when it concluded that Valero's incriminating
statements were the product of coercion. Although the police conduct must have
caused the confession, "it does not automatically follow that there has been a
violation of the Due Process Clause." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164
n.2 (1986). "For a defendant's statement to be found to be involuntarily given,
the defendant's will must have been overcome by the police at the time of the
confession." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,929,894 P.2d 159, 162 (Ct. App.
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1995). "[M]isrepresentations, of course, may cause a suspect to confess, but
causation alone does not constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions following
interrogations would be involuntary because it can almost always be said that the
interrogation caused the confession." Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051
(yth Cir., 1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here the district court stated it was "inclined to conclude that the [sic]
Bartlett's tactic was sufficient to overbear Valero's will" because the "tipping
point" of the interview was "Bartlett's assertion that he could prove 100% that
Valero was lying and that Valero's denial would certainly carry worse
consequences than would simply admitting the accusation." (R., p. 56. 1) The
district court then determined that the representations that the criminal act was
not a big deal, that the detective could testify that the crime happened, and that
lying to the police would make matters worse were the functional equivalent of
promising a defendant that his statements would not be used against him. (R.,
pp. 56-58 (quoting United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2010).) At no
time in its analysis, however, did the court find Valero's will to have been actually

The factual findings of the district court do not support a conclusion that the
misrepresentations identified by the court caused Valero to make incriminating
statements. The district court found that Detective Bartlett told Valero that
"touching the breast is 'not the end of the world, but what is getting you toward
the end of the world and getting you in a bad spot right now is the crime of lying
to the police.' Valero once again denied [having touched his foster daughter]."
(R., p. 53.) Thus, Valero made no incriminating statements in response to
Detective Bartlett's implication that Valero would be better off if he told the truth
instead of lied. When Valero later made incriminating statements his own stated
reason for doing so, as found by the district court, was that "he agreed that if the
polygraph machine said he did it, then he did it." (R., p. 53.) The factual findings
of the district court show that it was failure of the polygraph that caused Valero to
decide to make incriminating statements, not any alleged misrepresentation.
1
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overborne (R., p. 56 (statements "sufficient to" overbear will)), and at no point did
the district court consider in its analysis any of the other circumstances
surrounding the giving of the incriminating statements (R., pp. 56-58).
"In making the determination of whether a statement is voluntary, [the
court] look[s] to the totality of the circumstances." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho
926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). "The underlying purpose of this
standard is to determine whether the defendant's will was overborne." State v.
Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v.
Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000».

The totality of the

circumstances here, if actually considered, shows that Valero's will was not
overborne.
First, and foremost, Valero was informed of his Miranda rights and
voluntarily waived them. (R., p. 52.) The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated that "giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced
a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even
though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual
stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid
waiver." Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004). Despite the fact that
the district court found that Miranda rights had been given and waived, and
despite the fact that such waiver was of singular importance to the totality of the
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circumstances, the district court did not consider the Miranda waiver in its
analysis. (R., pp. 56-58. 2 )
Another significant factor is the length of the interview.

The Supreme

Court of the United States has stated "there is no authority for the proposition
that an interrogation of this length [three hours] is inherently coercive." Berghuis
v. Thompkins, _

U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010). Here the interview

was "just over 3 hours." (R., p. 52.) The district court erred by failing to consider
the length of the interview among the totalty of the circumstances. (R., pp. 5658.)
A third significant factor is custody. Indeed, this is often the first factor
considered by the court in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement. State v.
Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000) ("In determining whether
Radford's statements to law enforcement officers on June 4th were voluntary, we
first note it is undisputed that Radford was not in custody at the time the
statements were made.").

This is because "[m]any of the facts ... used in

deciding whether the interview was custodial or not are relevant to evaluating the
voluntariness of [the defendant's] statements." State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho
536, 544, 976 P.2d 462, 470 (1999).

Valero was told at the outset that his

participation in the interview was "on a voluntary basis" and that he was "free to

The district court acknowledged six factors, including whether Miranda warnings
were given, that should be included in an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances (R., pp. 54-55 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973», but did not mention any of those six factors in its analysis (R., pp.
55-58). The district court considered only one factor in its analysis-the three
misrepresentations it concluded Detective Bartlett had stated in the interview.
2
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leave." (R., p. 52.) This important factor, however, goes unmentioned in the
district court's analysis. (R., pp. 56-58.)
Finally, there are the characteristics of the defendant, such as his age,
education, and intelligence.

Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho at 544, 976 P.2d at 470

(quoting State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993)).

The

district court found that Valero is 38 years old, graduated from high school, and
was in special needs education in high school due to language issues but at the
time of the interview spoke fluent English. (R., pp. 53-54.) The district court did
not, however, mention these unremarkable characteristics in its analysis. (R., pp.
56-58.)
Application of the law to the facts found by the district court shows that
Valero's statements were voluntary. Factors showing voluntariness include that
Valero was informed of his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them; he was
not in custody and therefore not subjected to isolation from support or deprived of
food or sleep; the interrogation was of a non-coercive duration; and Valero had
no personal characteristics making him unusually vulnerable. The only factor in
question is the nature of the interrogation. As shown above, although Detective
Bartlett did resort to such tactics as downplaying the seriousness of the crime,
telling Valero that he would be able to testify to Valero's guilt, and that lying to the
police was very serious and a crime, such tactics are not constitutionally
coercive. Even if they could be deemed coercive they did not, under the totality
of the circumstances, overbear Valero's will.
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The district court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, and
actually considered only a single circumstance. Consideration of the totality of
the circumstances as required by the applicable legal standard shows there was
no improper coercion and that Valero's will was not overborne even if there had
been such coercion. The district court therefore committed reversible error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence of Valero's statements and remand for further
proceedings.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2011.
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